Learning by imitation

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00084-0zbMath1005.91026MaRDI QIDQ1960561

Erdem Başçı

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learning algorithmMarkov-Nash equilibriumprobability of convergencerecursive dynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

New leads in speculative behavior ⋮ Learning to speculate: Experiments with artificial and real agents ⋮ A dynamic analysis of Nash equilibria in search models with fiat money

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Money as a medium of exchange in an economy with artificially intelligent agents
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Experimental evidence on money as a medium of exchange
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• A learning-to-forecast experiment on the foreign exchange market with a classifier system

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