A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00124-XzbMath1016.91010OpenAlexW2024708349MaRDI QIDQ1960674

Val Eugene Lambson

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00124-x

zbMATH Keywords

penal codesdynamic stochastic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Repeated price competition with increasing marginal costs
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Price Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• Price Duopoly and Capacity Constraints

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