A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00118-4zbMath1016.91034OpenAlexW2097555118WikidataQ56335864 ScholiaQ56335864MaRDI QIDQ1960679

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00118-4

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremBertrand paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (16)

No Regret Learning in Oligopolies: Cournot vs. Bertrand ⋮ Oligopolistic price competition with a continuous demand ⋮ Bertrand games and sharing rules ⋮ (All) equilibria in a class of bidding games ⋮ Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization ⋮ Rebates in a Bertrand game ⋮ On the existence of positive equilibrium profits in competitive screening markets ⋮ A new look at the classical Bertrand duopoly ⋮ A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints ⋮ Contests with rank-order spillovers ⋮ A note on undominated Bertrand equilibria ⋮ Mixed Bertrand equilibria under decreasing returns to scale: an embarrassment of riches ⋮ CONSUMER MISTAKES IN BERTRAND GAMES ⋮ Games played in a contracting environment ⋮ Evolution of a collusive price in a networked market ⋮ Correlated equilibria in homogeneous good Bertrand competition

Cites Work

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• A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the Bertrand price game
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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