Auction design with a risk averse seller

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00115-9zbMath1005.91051OpenAlexW2054347841MaRDI QIDQ1960682

Péter Eső, Gábor Futó

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00115-9

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsinsurancerisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (11)

An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Efficient Money Burning in General Domains ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Sequential versus bundle auctions for recurring procurement ⋮ Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget ⋮ Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers ⋮ Multiagent Mechanism Design Without Money ⋮ Efficient money burning in general domains ⋮ Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments ⋮ A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types ⋮ An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

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