Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00047-0zbMath0991.91011OpenAlexW2090251127WikidataQ127063840 ScholiaQ127063840MaRDI QIDQ1961275

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 17 January 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(98)00047-0

zbMATH Keywords

imperfect informationbehavior strategy combinationinfinite action dynamic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Markov equilibria in discounted stochastic games

Cites Work

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• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Limit games and limit equilibria
• On the existence of subgame-perfect equilibrium in infinite-action games of perfect information
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Sequential Equilibria

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