Partially informative signaling

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2563zbMath0934.91005OpenAlexW2036143131MaRDI QIDQ1961368

Tommy Stamland

Publication date: 25 April 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2563

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesequilibrium construction algorithm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items

Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns

Cites Work

• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Competitive signalling
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria

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