Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00061-5zbMath0955.91014OpenAlexW2128900841WikidataQ55899881 ScholiaQ55899881MaRDI QIDQ1961954

H. Reiju Mihara

Publication date: 4 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(98)00061-5

zbMATH Keywords

recursion theoryArrow's impossibility theoremsocial welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

Infinite populations, choice and determinacy ⋮ Social choice correspondences with infinitely many agents: serial dictatorship ⋮ First-order logic formalisation of impossibility theorems in preference aggregation ⋮ A unifying impossibility theorem ⋮ On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences ⋮ Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings ⋮ Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products ⋮ Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games ⋮ Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities ⋮ Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules

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• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
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