Representation in majority tournaments
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Publication:1964740
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00007-4zbMath0937.91041MaRDI QIDQ1964740
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (8)
Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ Multi-dimensional rules ⋮ Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures ⋮ Gerrymander-proof representative democracies ⋮ The budget-voting paradox ⋮ Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox ⋮ Majority rip-off in referendum voting ⋮ Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models
Cites Work
- Avoiding Anscombe's paradox
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Anscombe's paradox and the rule of three-fourths
- Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
- Choosing from a tournament
- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
- Two-stage discrete aggregation: The Ostrogorski paradox and related phenomena
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Weak covering relations
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
- Tournament games and Condorcet voting
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- Voting paradoxes and referenda
- The Quota Method of Apportionment
- Tournament games and positive tournaments
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- Optimal Strategies for a Generalized "Scissors, Paper, and Stone" Game
- Formal Structure of Majority Decision
- The Theory of Representative Majority Decision
- Some Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Representative Decision on Two Alternatives
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
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