Social learning and costly information acquisition

DOI10.1007/s001990050006zbMath0944.91037OpenAlexW2006696047MaRDI QIDQ1969026

Roberto Burguet, Xavier Vives

Publication date: 22 June 2000

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050006

zbMATH Keywords

social learninginformation externalitycostly information acquisitionlearning from others

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (12)

The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Two-dimensional information acquisition in social learning ⋮ Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Information, coordination, and market frictions: an introduction ⋮ Reprint of: ``Information percolation in segmented markets ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare in network games ⋮ Learning from private and public observations of others' actions ⋮ Prospect theory and market quality ⋮ Learning, proximity and voting: theory and empirical evidence from nuclear referenda ⋮ Interacting information cascades: on the movement of conventions between groups ⋮ Herding with costly information ⋮ New product launch: Herd seeking or herd preventing?

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