Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system

DOI10.1006/jeem.1999.1092zbMath0961.91024OpenAlexW2044153984MaRDI QIDQ1969770

John K. Stranlund, Kanwalroop Kathy Dhanda

Publication date: 12 December 2000

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/resec_faculty_pubs/195

zbMATH Keywords

monitoring and enforcement effortsnoncompliant firmstransferable emissions permit system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement ⋮ The regulatory strategy in emissions trading system under costly enforcement ⋮ The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly ⋮ Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring

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