Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
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Publication:1970226
DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2576zbMath0940.91045OpenAlexW2125293595MaRDI QIDQ1970226
Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel, David K. Levine
Publication date: 19 March 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200614
Related Items (24)
Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets ⋮ Payoff information and learning in signaling games ⋮ Rational play in extensive-form games ⋮ Lexicographically maximal edges of dual hypergraphs and Nash-solvability of tight game forms ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Belief in the opponents' future rationality ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Learning to play Bayesian games. ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs ⋮ On pure conjectural equilibrium with non-manipulable information ⋮ Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ Mutually acceptable courses of action ⋮ The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension ⋮ Learning equilibrium as a generalization of learning to optimize ⋮ Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Categorizing others in a large game ⋮ On non-Nash equilibria ⋮ Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Backward induction versus forward induction reasoning ⋮ A note on the one-deviation property in extensive form games
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