Wealth effects in the principal agent model

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2570zbMath0937.91047OpenAlexW3125972173MaRDI QIDQ1970232

Achim Wambach, Henrik Thiele

Publication date: 19 March 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2570

zbMATH Keywords

agency costsprincipal's expected pay-offprincipal's surplus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (10)

The moral hazard problem with high stakes ⋮ The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action ⋮ On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach ⋮ Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems ⋮ Greater prudence and greater downside risk aversion ⋮ Incentives and the structure of teams ⋮ Wealth effects and agency costs ⋮ Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts ⋮ Reversibly greater downside risk aversion by a prudence-based measure ⋮ Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems

Cites Work

• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

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