Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
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Publication:1972232
DOI10.1007/s001820050082zbMath0941.91506OpenAlexW2127683434MaRDI QIDQ1972232
Publication date: 18 April 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050082
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (6)
An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence ⋮ Survival auctions ⋮ Elicitation using multiple price list formats ⋮ Gender effects in private value auctions ⋮ The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods ⋮ Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
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