The selectope for cooperative games

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Publication:1972258

DOI10.1007/s001820050003zbMath0959.91004OpenAlexW2057122735WikidataQ59868844 ScholiaQ59868844MaRDI QIDQ1972258

Jean J. M. Derks, H. J. M. Peters, Hans H. Haller

Publication date: 26 April 2001

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050003




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