Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information

DOI10.1007/s001820050005zbMath0939.91020OpenAlexW1979033783MaRDI QIDQ1972260

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 26 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://volij.co.il/publications/papers/communication.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcorecommon knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (10)

Information transmission in coalitional voting games ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ A note on the incentive compatible core ⋮ The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information ⋮ On the core of an economy with differential information ⋮ Incomplete information, credibility and the core ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey. ⋮ The core of economies with asymmetric information: An axiomatic approach.

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