On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(99)00012-9zbMath0938.91017MaRDI QIDQ1972344

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 25 June 2000

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

decision makingprobabilityvoting rulesCondorcet

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (14)

Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? ⋮ On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox ⋮ IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ Complexity and the geometry of voting ⋮ Likelihood of voting outcomes with generalized IAC probabilities ⋮ The geometry of Black's single peakedness and related conditions ⋮ Generalized Condorcet winners ⋮ Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis ⋮ Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules ⋮ The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes ⋮ The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences ⋮ On the stability of a triplet of scoring rules ⋮ Consequences of reversing preferences ⋮ The probability that all weighted scoring rules elect the same winner

Cites Work

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• The Copeland method. I: Relationships and the dictionary
• The sensitivity of weight selection on the Condorcet efficiency of weighted scoring rules
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• On probability models in voting theory

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