Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation.

DOI10.1007/S001820050060zbMath1058.91508OpenAlexW2014204546MaRDI QIDQ1972569

Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050060

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoremRepeated gamespublic signals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (9)

Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games ⋮ Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring ⋮ Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors ⋮ A folk theorem for minority games

Cites Work

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• An analog of the minimax theorem for vector payoffs
• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non- observable actions
• Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
• Nash equilibria of repeated games with observable payoff vectors
• Nash equilibria of \(n\)-player repeated games with semi-standard information
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Two-Player Repeated Games with Nonobservable Actions and Observable Payoffs
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information

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