Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?

DOI10.1007/s001820050063zbMath1058.91502OpenAlexW1993119609MaRDI QIDQ1972572

Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050063

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Related Items (4)

Self-accessibility and repeated games with asymmetric discounting ⋮ On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting ⋮ The use of public randomization in discounted repeated games ⋮ Finitely repeated games: a generalized Nash folk theorem

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

This page was built for publication: Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?