\(\epsilon\)-consistent equilibrium in repeated games.

DOI10.1007/S001820050069zbMath1058.91514OpenAlexW1969780966MaRDI QIDQ1972575

Sylvain Sorin, Ehud Lehrer

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050069

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium ⋮ Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria

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