On the core of a collection of coalitions.
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Publication:1972593
DOI10.1007/s001820050084zbMath1058.91509OpenAlexW1574181519WikidataQ59868859 ScholiaQ59868859MaRDI QIDQ1972593
Jean J. M. Derks, Hans Reijnierse
Publication date: 11 April 2000
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050084
Related Items (12)
Stable allocations of risk ⋮ Remarkable polyhedra related to set functions, games and capacities ⋮ Restricted component additive games ⋮ Games on concept lattices: Shapley value and core ⋮ Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness ⋮ On balanced games with infinitely many players: revisiting Schmeidler's result ⋮ Characterization of the core in games with restricted cooperation ⋮ Balancedness conditions for exact games ⋮ The core of games on ordered structures and graphs ⋮ The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy ⋮ Ensuring the boundedness of the core of games with restricted cooperation ⋮ A NOTE ON THE MONOTONIC CORE
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