Repeated proximity games.

DOI10.1007/s001820050089zbMath1058.91516OpenAlexW2094420986MaRDI QIDQ1972603

Jérôme Renault, Tristan Tomala

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050089

zbMATH Keywords

graphsimperfect monitoringRepeated gamesFolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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