Crowding games are sequentially solvable

DOI10.1007/s001820050086zbMath0943.91011OpenAlexW2003647911MaRDI QIDQ1972605

Igal Milchtaich

Publication date: 11 April 2000

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050086

zbMATH Keywords

congestion gamespure-strategy equilibriacrowding gamessequential solvability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

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