Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms
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Publication:1972843
DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0708zbMath0938.91007OpenAlexW2013983743MaRDI QIDQ1972843
Publication date: 25 June 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/02de8784b59c7bff0dfb62f73ec741097f4f3e25
oligopolyasymmetric firmscoalition-proof Nash equilibrium coalitiongames of coalition formationopen membership
Related Items (8)
COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY ⋮ ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard ⋮ The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go ⋮ Group bargaining in supply chains ⋮ Stability analysis of horizontal mergers in a market with asymmetric substitutability ⋮ Endogenous mergers in markets with vertically differentiated products
Cites Work
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- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- An existence result for coalition-proof equilibrium
- Equilibria in a model with partial rivalry
- Coalition-proofness and correlation with arbitrary communication possibilities
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Monotone Comparative Statics
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