Multi-issue bargaining with endogenous agenda
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Publication:1972846
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0710zbMath0938.91005OpenAlexW1999908607MaRDI QIDQ1972846
Publication date: 25 June 2000
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/b931d44809961b9c771886f47601be451992df97
Related Items (19)
Joint games and compatibility ⋮ All in good time ⋮ Only a dictatorship is efficient ⋮ Agenda restrictions in multi-issue bargaining. II: Unrestricted agendas ⋮ Cores of combined games ⋮ Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Modelling negotiated decision making in environmental and natural resource management: a multilateral, multiple issues, non-cooperative bargaining model with uncertainty ⋮ An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment ⋮ Bidding games and efficient allocations ⋮ A dynamic bargaining game with externalities ⋮ Omnibus or not: package bills and single-issue bills in a legislative bargaining game ⋮ A note on multi-issue bargaining with a finite set of alternatives ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ UNIQUE EQUILIBRIA IN THE RUBINSTEIN BARGAINING MODEL WHEN THE PAYOFF SET IS NON-CONVEX ⋮ Conflict and competition over multi-issues ⋮ Representation in multi-issue delegated bargaining ⋮ The game of negotiations: Ordering issues and implementing agreements ⋮ An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Cites Work
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- Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
- The importance of the agenda in bargaining
- Signaling via an agenda in multi-issue bargaining with incomplete information
- Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
- A comment on issue-by-issue negotiations
- An extension of the Nash bargaining solution to nonconvex problems
- Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preference
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
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