Bargaining through agents: An experimental study of delegation and commitment

DOI10.1006/game.1999.0728zbMath0962.91013OpenAlexW2160523509MaRDI QIDQ1973451

Blaine Snyder, Andrew Schotter, Wei Zheng

Publication date: 27 April 2000

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/c964687c286830454b6376d38aa6c360ce3f7e63

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingagentsdelegation gamescommitment gamespreference distortion games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Noisy leadership: An experimental approach ⋮ Trust and reciprocity behavior and behavioral forecasts: Individuals versus group-representatives ⋮ When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game ⋮ On the impact of an intermediary agent in the ultimatum game

Cites Work

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• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
• Strategic delegation in bargaining
• Reinterpreting arbitration's narcotic effect: An experimental study of learning in repeated bargaining
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• The Role of Information in Bargaining: An Experimental Study
• Observable Contracts: Strategic Delegation and Cooperation
• Unobserved Delegation

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