Eliciting preferences to assign positions and compensation
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Publication:1973452
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0718zbMath0984.91029OpenAlexW1970570879MaRDI QIDQ1973452
Publication date: 2 May 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0718
Related Items (29)
No-envy and egalitarian-equivalence under multi-object-demand for heterogeneous objects ⋮ Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions ⋮ Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a market design approach ⋮ House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence ⋮ Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Consistent house allocation ⋮ Maskin monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem ⋮ Secure implementation in Shapley-Scarf housing markets ⋮ A Solomonic solution to the problem of assigning a private indivisible good ⋮ Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices ⋮ Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations ⋮ Strategy-proof and symmetric allocation of an indivisible good ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money ⋮ Characterizations of strategy-proof and fair mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods ⋮ House allocation with transfers ⋮ The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching ⋮ Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Manipulation through bribes ⋮ Fair Groves mechanisms ⋮ Collusion-proof and fair auctions ⋮ Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation
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