Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00027-XzbMath0947.91003OpenAlexW2167668758MaRDI QIDQ1974050

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 12 November 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(99)00027-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumspatial modelscoalition bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (1)

Political equilibria with electoral uncertainty

Cites Work

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• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory
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• A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem, with Application to Nash Equilibrium Points

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