A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00030-XzbMath0966.91017WikidataQ127646285 ScholiaQ127646285MaRDI QIDQ1974054

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 8 May 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamelong run equilibriumfinite population evolutionarily stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (3)

Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations ⋮ Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games ⋮ The asset market game

Cites Work

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• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Bandwagon effects and long run technology choice
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Equilibrium selection in \(n\)-person coordination games
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"

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