An experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game

DOI10.1007/S001990050020zbMath0958.91053OpenAlexW2070003395MaRDI QIDQ1974604

Arijit Mukherji, David E. Runkle, Kevin A. McCabe

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050020

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian learningNash equilibriumexperimental

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

The development of randomization and deceptive behavior in mixed strategy games

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