Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure

DOI10.1007/s001990050024zbMath0956.91008OpenAlexW2149682812MaRDI QIDQ1974609

P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/two-simple-proofs-of-the-feasibility-of-the-linear-tracing-procedure(aa81d194-cfe2-4200-8360-ecb94670c014).html

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium selectiontracing procedurenon-cooperative game theoryBrowder's fixed point theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (9)

On the implications of integrating linear tracing procedure with imprecise probabilities ⋮ Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory ⋮ A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games ⋮ An arbitrary starting tracing procedure for computing subgame perfect equilibria ⋮ A fixed point theorem for discontinuous functions ⋮ A differentiable homotopy method to compute perfect equilibria ⋮ Probabilistic choice in games: properties of Rosenthal's \(t\)-solutions ⋮ Universally converging adjustment processes -- a unifying approach. ⋮ Complementarity enhanced Nash's mappings and differentiable homotopy methods to select perfect equilibria

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