Choquet rationality

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2599zbMath1038.91521OpenAlexW2911566122MaRDI QIDQ1977402

Paolo Ghirardato, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fab74884adf5c2a75f4bf6b20812a6e1e65cd580

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilitydecision problemBernoulli rationalChoquet rationalShafer rational

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

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A NOTE ON THE EQUIVALENCE OF RATIONALIZABILITY CONCEPTS IN GENERALIZED NICE GAMES, Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets, ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach., An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences, Coherent Dempster-Shafer equilibrium and ambiguous signals, Non-additive anonymous games, Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions, Strategic games with security and potential level players, Games of incomplete information: a framework based on belief functions, Ambiguous games, Conditional expectation for monotone measures, the discrete case, Ambiguity and awareness: a coherent multiple priors model, Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty

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