Second mover disadvantages in a three-player Stackelberg game with private information

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2608zbMath1082.91504OpenAlexW1984210834MaRDI QIDQ1977405

Tetsuya Shinkai

Publication date: 8 May 2001

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2608

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model ⋮ Price leadership in a homogeneous product market ⋮ One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information ⋮ Privatization neutrality theorem in free entry markets

Cites Work

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• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Perfect competition as the limit of a hierarchical market game
• Reputation with noisy precommitment
• Commitment and observability in games
• Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing
• First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information

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