Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
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Publication:1978178
DOI10.1016/S0012-365X(99)00260-5zbMath1078.91554arXivmath/9801096MaRDI QIDQ1978178
Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander
Publication date: 2000
Published in: Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/math/9801096
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