A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
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Publication:1978245
DOI10.1016/S0004-3702(99)00092-2zbMath0943.68148MaRDI QIDQ1978245
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Related Items (2)
An algebraic approach to belief contraction and nonmonotonic entailment ⋮ A representation theorem for recovering contraction relations satisfying wci
Cites Work
- Theory contraction through base contraction
- On the status of the postulate of recovery in the logic of theory change
- Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
- Propositional knowledge base revision and minimal change
- A foundational theory of belief and belief change
- Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
- Nonmonotonic inference based on expectations
- Severe withdrawal (and recovery)
- Theory contraction and base contraction unified
- On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
- Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice
- Belief contraction as nonmonotonic inference
- Entrenchment versus dependence: Coherence and foundations in belief change
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