Distributional properties of the uniform rule in economies with single-peaked preferences
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Publication:1978323
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00250-5zbMath0945.91031OpenAlexW2122543193MaRDI QIDQ1978323
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(99)00250-5
uniform ruleeconomies with single-peaked preferencesconvex no-envygreatest upper boundleast lower bound
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (2)
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
Cites Work
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
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