Uncertainty aversion and rationality in games of perfect information
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Publication:1978481
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00089-XzbMath1006.91014OpenAlexW2059353387WikidataQ126843918 ScholiaQ126843918MaRDI QIDQ1978481
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(98)00089-x
Related Items (3)
Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Stable equilibrium in beliefs in extensive games with perfect information ⋮ The foundation of stability in extensive games with perfect information
Cites Work
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