Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00236-0zbMath0945.91033WikidataQ127015929 ScholiaQ127015929MaRDI QIDQ1978524

R. Fahr, Bernd Irlenbusch

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

trustfairnessexperimentsreciprocityproperty rightsreal effortmindreading

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (3)

Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations ⋮ The impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin on contributions in best-shot public good games ⋮ Trust with private and common property: effects of stronger property right entitlements

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• More is better, but fair is fair: Tipping in dictator and ultimatum games
• Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games
• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• On expectations and the monetary stakes in ultimatum games
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence

This page was built for publication: Fairness as a constraint on trust in reciprocity: Earned property rights in a reciprocal exchange experiment