On a characterization of stable matchings
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Publication:1978730
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00241-4zbMath0953.91048MaRDI QIDQ1978730
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Cites Work
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- Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- A lattice-theoretical fixpoint theorem and its applications
- Monotone Comparative Statics
- Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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