Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
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Publication:1982858
DOI10.1134/S0005117921070018zbMath1471.91082OpenAlexW3194983277MaRDI QIDQ1982858
N. A. Korgin, V. N. Burkov, A. K. Enaleev
Publication date: 14 September 2021
Published in: Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117921070018
strategy-proofnessmechanism designrevelation principleincentive compatibilityactive systemactive planingfair play principle
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