Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110013zbMath1471.91136OpenAlexW3183262242MaRDI QIDQ1984420

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 16 September 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110013

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designaggregation of experts' judgmentsimpartial expertssupermajority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (1)

Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate

Cites Work

• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Impartial Nominations for a Prize
• Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes

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