Tariff evasion with endogenous enforcement

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110046zbMATH Open1471.91294OpenAlexW3193652103MaRDI QIDQ1984461

Adrien Bussy

Publication date: 16 September 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110046

zbMATH Keywords

international tradecorruptiontax enforcementTariff evasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

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