Unilateral substitutability is necessary for doctor-optimal stability

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2021.110047zbMath1471.91344OpenAlexW3193776819MaRDI QIDQ1984462

Yusuke Kasuya

Publication date: 16 September 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110047

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsunilateral substitutabilitydoctor-optimal stabilityobservable substitutability across doctors

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• On stable and strategy-proof rules in matching markets with contracts
• Cumulative offer process is order-independent
• Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory

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