Stability and immunity to capacity manipulation in large matching markets

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110002zbMath1471.91343OpenAlexW3183425018MaRDI QIDQ1984501

Morteza Honarvar, Behrang Kamali Shahdadi

Publication date: 16 September 2021

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2021.110002

zbMATH Keywords

market designmatching theorylarge market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
• Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
• Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

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