Separation between second price auctions with personalized reserves and the revenue optimal auction

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2020.02.002OpenAlexW3005743943MaRDI QIDQ1984694

Balasubramanian Sivan, Will Ma

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1906.11657

zbMATH Keywords

second price auctionsBayesian mechanism designapproximation ratiossequential posted pricingsingle-item auctionssuboptimal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (2)

Tight Revenue Gaps among Multiunit Mechanisms ⋮ Maximizing revenue for publishers using header bidding and ad exchange auctions

Cites Work

• Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
• Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms
• Unnamed Item

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