A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002zbMath1433.91081OpenAlexW2995358960WikidataQ126560350 ScholiaQ126560350MaRDI QIDQ1985725

Carlos Rafels, Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanismsubgame perfect equilibriagross substitutesVickrey outcome

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes
• A simple selling and buying procedure
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Incentives in Teams
• Package Auctions and Exchanges

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