Random assignments of bundles

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.12.003zbMath1433.91096OpenAlexW3000564590WikidataQ126357615 ScholiaQ126357615MaRDI QIDQ1985726

Peng Liu, Shurojit Chatterji

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2429

zbMATH Keywords

decomposabilitysd-efficiencyequal treatment of equalsbundlesrandom assignmentssd-strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (4)

The vigilant eating rule: a general approach for probabilistic economic design with constraints ⋮ Multi resource allocation with partial preferences ⋮ A simple characterization of assignment mechanisms on set constraints ⋮ Random assignments of bundles

Cites Work

• Assignment problems with complementarities
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible objects when agents have the same preferences except the ordinal ranking of one object
• Random assignments of bundles
• Random assignments on preference domains with a tier structure
• Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
• Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences
• Approximate Random Allocation Mechanisms
• Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
• Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
• Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
• A new solution to the random assignment problem.

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