False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad
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Publication:1985730
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.10.004zbMath1436.91012OpenAlexW2101592850WikidataQ127859411 ScholiaQ127859411MaRDI QIDQ1985730
Theodore To, Richmond Harbaugh
Publication date: 7 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://kelley.iu.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2005-05-harbaugh-to.pdf
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