Frequency based analysis of collective aggregation rules

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.003zbMath1436.91059OpenAlexW3000935695WikidataQ126308327 ScholiaQ126308327MaRDI QIDQ1985731

Ton Storcken, Swarnendu Chatterjee

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.003

zbMATH Keywords

votingplurality ruleBorda ruleunimodal distributionCondorcet consistent rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Condorcet’s Paradox