Graduate admission with financial support

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.006zbMath1436.91084OpenAlexW3004236410MaRDI QIDQ1985735

Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.006

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitymatchingstrategy-proofnessfinancial supportgraduate admissionrespecting improvement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Financial aid in college admissions: need-based versus merit-based

Cites Work

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