On the merit of non-specialization in the context of majority voting

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.002zbMath1436.91058OpenAlexW3004293467MaRDI QIDQ1985737

Eyal Baharad, Tal Patal, Ruth Ben-Yashar

Publication date: 7 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

votingspecializationbinary choicesimple majority ruleCJTcollective probability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The generalized homogeneity assumption and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Monotonicity in Condorcet jury theorem
• Proving a distribution-free generalization of the Condorcet jury theorem
• Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
• When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
• A nonasymptotic Condorcet jury theorem
• Symmetric and asymmetric committees
• Is diversity in capabilities desirable when adding decision makers?
• Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
• The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result

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